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Aztec seems to have been hacked again, with its Private Rollup Bridge 0x737901bea3eeb88459df9ef1BE8fF3Ae1B42A2ba showing three suspicious exploits (totaling about $2.15 million): 1,158 ETH etherscan.io/tx/0xab306cd21 … 150,000 DAI etherscan.io/tx/0x5c196c37a … 0.46963295 renBTC etherscan.io/tx/0x9e1d6ab7c … The funds are mainly in: 0x6952d9246e9aFE8B887B2877225163436F78E97F Of which some ETH was transferred to: 0x15930a0fef3421f48c6553b5691682cc1b22edb3 0x33d6a0d9bc210e823e043d604179cd844eb467df Attacker address Gas source unionchain.ai Preliminary analysis of the cause: Aztec RollupProcessor's Escape Hatch allows any caller to submit a rollup proof acceptable to the verifier during the open window. The contract in processDepositsAndWithdrawals() only executes L1 asset releases based on the public output field in proofData: when the inner tx satisfies proofId == 0 and publicOutput > 0, RollupProcessor calls withdraw(publicOutput, outputOwner, assetId), directly paying the corresponding asset from its own custodial reserves to outputOwner. The attack address continuously constructs/submits escape-hatch proofs, making the inner tx in proofData declare: - assetId = 0, publicOutput = 1,158 ETH - assetId = 1, publicOutput = 150,000 DAI - assetId = 2, publicOutput = 0.46963295 renBTC Since these withdrawals were accepted by the proof/state transition, RollupProcessor released assets from its own ETH / DAI / renBTC reserves to the attacker's address. For specific details, see what @aztecnetwork has to say. cc @SlowMist_Team @MistTrack_io Tweeted at 2:05 AM · Jun 18, 2026

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